# 1ac

#### Still the same

# 2ac

## 2ac- T- QPQ

#### Either is topical

Haass 00 – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

## CP

### 2ac – link non-unique

#### Link has been triggered – Obama announced the plan

Feldmyn 8/9/13 – (Elliot, “United States: TPP, TTIP, And Congress: The Elephant In The Room”, Mondaq, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/257058/international+trade+investment/TPP+TTIP+And+Congress+The+Elephant+In+The+Room)

The Washington trade policy community is buzzing over the two largest international trade negotiations since the effective collapse of the Doha multilateral trade round. The buzz may be even louder in foreign capitals. The Obama Administration, in mid-July, was still promising to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP") negotiations by year-end, while starting up the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") negotiations with similar speedy objectives. For both deals there is engagement and enthusiasm. Inside U.S. Trade, the trade community's weekly Bible, devoted over thirty pages, all but one article in a recent edition, to these negotiations.

### 2ac- Space

#### Plan is key to Florida Econ

McGurgan 9/25- Kevin, Tampa Bay Times, (“Column: Free trade's boost for Florida”, September 25, 2013 http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-free-trades-boost-for-florida/2143880\\CLans)

Realizing this, the United States and the European Union, the group of trading nations of which the United Kingdom is a leading member, have negotiated a deal to reduce or remove as many barriers as possible. The first round of negotiations has already taken place, and we hope to reach agreement within the next 18 months. We are calling it the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP for short. The United States and the EU are the two largest economies in the world, with a combined value of around $30 trillion. U.S.-EU trade is worth $2.5 billion every day, one third of all world trade, and it's increasing all the time. A million jobs in the United States depend on trade with Britain alone. They tend to be good, well-paid jobs, with salaries above the U.S. average. So we always knew that the boost to our economies from freeing up trade was going to be large. What we didn't know, until recently, was how each individual state would benefit. Now the results are in. A September 2013 study by the British Embassy in Washington, Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council finds that TTIP could add more than 740,000 jobs to the U.S. economy as a whole — that's the equivalent of the entire working population of West Virginia. The average American household would stand to gain around $865 every year as a result of lower prices and higher average wages. You can find the study, which was just released, online at www.gov.uk and tinyurl.com/tbtimes-UK. But what does this mean for Florida, already one of the most pro-free trade states in the union? Florida already exports $6.1 billion worth of goods and $9.3 billion worth of services to the EU. The predictions are good. The study projects that a U.S.-EU trade deal could add as many as 47,540 jobs to the Florida job market and boost Florida's exports to Europe by 26.9 percent. Many of those export gains will be realized in aerospace, transportation and chemicals, while the largest job increases should be seen in business and financial services. I believe that's good news for the Tampa Bay area and Florida as a whole. Tampa is already home to major British companies such as BAE Systems, British Airways World Cargo and the medical device company of Smith and Nephew. The strategic investments you are making in ports, infrastructure, workforce and research at quality universities such as the University of South Florida, aligned with this trade deal, will continue to make Tampa Bay an attractive and competitive place to invest in and do business with. Beyond the economics, the study also represents a key strategic opportunity for the United States and the EU. As a diplomat who has spent one-third of his career living in the United States, I believe that an ambitious game-changing agreement has the potential to send a powerful message to the rest of the world regarding the trans-Atlantic commitment to global rules and standards in international trade. These numbers show that free trade is not just an idea. It has real benefits, both for business and for hard-working people. And that's why Floridians, and all Americans, should be excited about this deal.

#### That’s key to effective space missions

Kinsey 12- Troy, Report for WCTV News Agency (“Florida's Space Industry Struggles to Survive” http://www.wctv.tv/news/headlines/Floridas\_Space\_Industry\_Struggles\_to\_Survive\_149179995.html\\CLans)

For 50 years, it's been a critical part of Florida's economy. But now our space industry is struggling to survive. The retirement of the shuttle program has left thousands of workers jobless. And, it's also called into question whether Florida's days as America's pre-eminent space state are over. After 30 years and more than 130 missions, the space shuttle program has disappeared into history. And now the talent, technology and patriotism that helped drive it may be in jeopardy of disappearing, too. Tim pickens works at dynetics, a NASA contractor in Huntsville, Alabama. He's committed to reviving Florida's space industry, not least because his company depends on it. Now that manned missions launching from Cape Canaveral are no more...He says it'll be up to a handful of private space flight companies to help inspire a national movement. "People are going to say, 'NASA, what's the vision? Where are we going?' and then, they need to be looking at air breathing technology, you know, hypersonics, and you know, 'how do i get my ride from New York to LA In 15 minutes?' Pickens says only the government can pioneer that kind of technology, and if enough people ask for it, Washington will pay for it. But, there's no guarantee manned launches will return to Florida. That's why Farrukh Alvi spearheads a research hub aimed at using space technology in other ways. "I suspect that Florida will not be the only one that's going to be launching things - Texas, New Mexico and others. But, you need to have a more diverse economy, so even if it's very successful, you do not want to just invest in there - you need to diversify." Areas like green energy and biotech - they could be a big part of america's economic future. And, in the end, blasting off from Texas and New Mexico may not be possible...Because of Florida.

#### Extinction is inevitable – laundry list – deep-space exploration key to solve

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[David Poston, . 16 continuous years of experience in the field of space nuclear power and is currently the nuclear design lead for all LANL space reactor projects. Dr. Poston received a BS in Mechanical Engineering the University of Michigan, an MS in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University, an MS in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California at Berkeley, and a“Space Nuclear Power: Fission Reactors”, <http://spacenuke.blogspot.com/2012/02/space-fission-power-post-1-we-need-to.html>’]

Viability and Preservation.¶The all-or-nothing benefit of space exploration is the long-term survivalof the human race; although the extended timeframe of this benefit makes it very hard to quantify.We know that our life on Earth is finite, but the preservation benefit of sustained civilization outside of the Earth could range from enormous to miniscule depending on whether viability of human life on Earth ends in <1 thousand years or >1 billion years. There is a long list of potential calamities that could end human civilization, including asteroid/comet, super-virus, excess volcanism, socioeconomic collapse,environmental changes, weapons of mass destruction, ormaybe something we’ve never envisioned. Some of these initiating events can be mitigated or prevented as a result ofspace exploration; most notablythe ability to deflect or destroy a potential extinction causing asteroid or comet. The ability to deflect an asteroid could actually be developed within a decadeusing existing technology, the question is would we have enough warning time to successfully develop and deploy it. Space exploration could also uncover currentlyunknown threats, such as looming changes in the behavior of the sun, or maybe astronomical threats such as nearby black holes,supernovae, darkmatter, orsomething our current understanding of physics is not aware of.¶The ultimate defense against human extinctionwould be to establish permanent, self-sustaining colonies of humans beyond the Earth. The path to this type of existence does not require a huge leap in science and technology; most engineers agree that abundant, reliable energy (probably nuclear) isthe key to expanding into space. In the near term (decades) exploration could focus on where and how to develop sustainable communities away from the earth, includingquasi-sustainable outposts on the moon and Mars. In the mid-term (centuries) sustainable outposts could be created on Mars, Titan, asteroids, etc. that could beconsidered planetary lifeboats, as a safeguard against major calamities that could end human civilization. In the long term (millennia), the concept of the “planetary lifeboat” could transform to a “celestial Mayflower”, taking us to new worlds outside of our solar system. The benefits of this scenario are not limited to merely saving the human race.Even if humanity continues to thrive on Earth, there would be the possibility for a nearly unlimited number of humans to experience existence (in addition to the increased population that Earth could support by importing resources) and expand the extent of human condition (e.g. well-being, knowledge, and enlightenment). If new opportunities and experiences emerge, people will migrate to them, just as they did to the New World ~500 years ago.¶

### 2ac – US Civil War

**Mexican instability spills over to the US, sparking civil war.**

Steven **David 99**, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis

CONFLICTS FOUGHT within the borders of a single state send shock waves far beyond their frontiers. To begin with, internal wars risk destroying assets the United States needs. Were the Persian Gulf oil fields destroyed in a Saudi civil war, the American economy (and those of the rest of the developed world) would suffer severely. Internal wars can also unleash threats that stable governments formerly held in check. As central governments weaken and fall, weapons of mass destruction may fall into the hands of rogue leaders or anti-American factions. More directly, internal wars endanger American citizens living and traveling abroad. Liberia will not be the last place America sends helicopters to rescue its stranded citizens. Finally, internal wars, when they erupt on U.S. borders, threaten to destabilize America itself. U.S. intervention in Haiti was spurred, in large part, by fear of the flood of refugees poised to enter the United States. All of these dangers are grave enough to warrant consideration; what makes them even more serious is the fact that their impact on America is largely unintended. Being unintended, the spill-off effects of civil wars are not easily deterred, which creates unique challenges to American interests. U.S. policymakers have traditionally tried to sway foreign leaders through a simple formula: ensure that the benefits of defying America are outweighed by the punishment that the United States will inflict if defied. That calculus, however, no longer applies when there is no single, rational government in place to deter. This raises the cost to America; if the United States (or any country) cannot deter a threat, it must turn to actual self-defense or preemption instead. Unlike deterrence, these strategies are enormously difficult to carry out and in some cases (such as preventing the destruction of the Saudi oil fields) would be impossible. Without deterrence as a policy option, Washington loses its most effective means of safeguarding its interests. Where are these new threats likely to crop up? And which should the United States be concerned with? Two criteria must guide policymakers in answering these questions. First is the actual likelihood of civil war in any particular state. American interests would be endangered by a war in Canada, but the prospect is so improbable it can safely be ignored. Second is the impact of a civil war on the United States; would it threaten vital American security and economic concerns? Future conflict in Sierra Leone may be plausible, but it would have such a negligible impact on the United States that it does not justify much attention. Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebe8llion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent. BREAKING MEXICO'S HABIT MEXICO TODAY faces a future more uncertain than at any other point in its modern history. Pervasive corruption financed by drug traffickers, the end of one-party rule, armed revolt, and economic disaster have all surfaced over the past few years. In response, the Mexican army has begun to question its decades-old record of non-interference in politics. Should Mexico collapse into chaos, even for a short period of time, vital American interests will be endangered. This, in turn, raises the specter of U.S. intervention. The growing influence of drug money is the greatest single source of Mexican instability. The narcotics industry has worked its way into the fabric of Mexican society, to the extent that it is now Mexico's largest hard currency source (estimated at $ 30 billion per year) and is probably the country's largest employer. As in Colombia, drug dealers threaten to take control of the state. More worrying, senior Mexican officials -- including those in charge of the antidrug effort -- are routinely found to be working for drug cartels. Major drug traffickers have assembled their own private armies and operate without fear of prosecution. Crime, much of it drug financed, runs rampant throughout the country, particularly in Mexico City. In 1995, then-CIA director John Deutch signaled his concern for the impact of drugs on Mexico by making that country a strategic intelligence priority for the first time. It may, however, already be too late for help from Washington. The control of Mexico by drug traffickers will be hard to reverse, especially since, given the central role the drug lords play in Mexican life, doing so might further destabilize the country. The Mexican economy provides a second source of civil conflict. The country still has not recovered from its 1994 economic crisis, when the devaluation of the peso sparked fear of total financial collapse. Disaster was averted by the extraordinary intervention of the United States and the International Monetary Fund, which provided a $ 50 billion bailout. Despite this assistance, inflation climbed to 52 percent (up from 7 percent the year before), real earnings dropped by as much as 12 percent, the GDP shrank 6 percent, and over 25 percent of Mexicans fell seriously behind in debt repayment. Though conditions have improved slightly in the years since, the basic problems that caused the devaluation in the first place remain -- such as reliance on foreign investment to finance growth. These problems, combined with crushing Mexican poverty (85 percent of Mexicans are either unemployed or not earning a living wage), falling oil prices, and the widening gap between the prosperous north and the impoverished south, together form the basis for future unrest. Ironically, the advent of true democracy has further threatened Mexican stability. For 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled the nominally democratic country as a private fiefdom. The PRI made all key decisions and chose all important officials (including the president) while suppressing meaningful dissent. The monopoly ended in 1997, however, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower house of parliament to two competing political parties. The Conservative Party (PAN) now threatens the PRI in the more prosperous north while the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has gained support among poor southerners, students, and intellectuals, and has won the key post of mayor of Mexico City. The fall of the PRI may enhance stability in the long term, as oppressed groups see their demands addressed for the first time. But the transition itself will be dangerous; states in the process of democratizing are far more vulnerable to civil conflict than are mature democracies or authoritarian regimes. As opposition parties declare their intent to expose the PRI's corrupt and criminal history, the order which Mexico has enjoyed for 70 years will be the first casualty of the new freedom. As if to illustrate the potential for disorder, major armed uprisings have once again erupted. Mexico has suffered a long tradition of regional warfare, dating back to its earliest days of independence. After decades of peace, this threat reemerged in the mid-1990s, and now endangers the stability of the state. In January 1994, some 4,000 "Zapatista" rebels, fearful of losing their land, seized seven towns in the southern state of Chiapas. Though they were poorly armed, the support they received throughout Mexico and the army's inability to quell their revolt starkly demonstrated the weakness of the Mexican government. That weakness grew even more pronounced when it was revealed that the government had turned to paramilitary groups to suppress the rebels. One such group massacred 45 civilians in December 1997, sparking widespread protest and investigations of government complicity. Meanwhile, the less well known but potentially more dangerous People's Revolutionary Army (EPR) launched a rebellion in 1996 by attacking military and economic targets in six southern states. Unlike the Zapatistas, the EPR openly seeks to overthrow the current regime. While its prospects of doing so may be remote, the EPR's very existence drives a thorn into the government's side. Amidst these struggles, the Mexican military may abandon its long tradition of noninvolvement in politics. Since the 1980s, the government has called on the military to suppress drug-related violence within the country. This use of the military for domestic purposes drew it directly into political disputes it had shied from in the past, and risked spreading corruption within the ranks. Meanwhile, the end of the PRI's monopoly on power may further destabilize the armed forces. For the first time in their history, the troops face an institutionally divided leadership. The military might split into rival political factions, especially if opposition parties are prevented from exercising power. Conflict in Mexico threatens a wide range of core American interests. A civil war would endanger the 350,000 Americans live south of the border who. Direct American investments of at least $ 50 billion would be threatened, as would $ 156 billion in bilateral trade and a major source of petroleum exports. Illegal immigrants would swarm across the 2,000-mile frontier, fleeing civil conflict. And armed incursions might follow; during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, fighting spilled over the border often enough that the United States had to deploy roughly half its armed forces to contain the conflict. In a future war, the millions of Americans with family in Mexico might take sides in the fighting, sparking violence within the United States.

**Extinction**

James **Pinkerton 03**, fellow at the New America Foundation, , Freedom and Survival, p. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2003/freedom\_and\_survival

Historically, the only way that the slow bureaucratic creep of government is reversed is through revolution or war. And that could happen. But there's a problem: the next American revolution won't be fought with muskets. It could well be waged with proliferated wonder-weapons. That is, about the time that American yeopersons decide to resist the encroachment of the United Nations, or the European Union—or the United States government—the level of destructive power in a future conflict could remove the choice expressed by Patrick Henry in his ringing cry, "Give me liberty, or give me death." The next big war could kill everybody, free and unfree alike.

## 2ac – Security

### Framework

Framework – Our interpretation is that the neg gets the status quo or competitive policy option – that’s key to fairness- infinite assumptions in the 1AC– we should get the aff as offense – also key to plan focus which is necessary for in depth debates

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

#### Perm do the plan and implement an intellectual criticism of securitizing representations

### 2ac – biopolitics turn

**Their K creates a world without political enmity – creates a terrifying system without an exterior – enemies re-appear in internalized struggles – that causes worse biopolitical violence**

**Prozorov 06** /Professor of International Relations at Petrozavodsk State University, Russia/ [Sergei, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies]

Schmitt’s concern with the liberal effacement of pluralism in the name of cosmopolitan humanity does not merely seek to unravel hypocrisy or ridicule inconsistency but has more serious implications in the context of the transcendental function of enmity that we have introduced above. For Schmitt, the ‘pluriversal’ structure of international relations accords with his political ontology that affirms the ineradicability of difference, from which, as we have discussed, Schmitt infers the ever-present ‘extreme possibility’ and the demand for the decision on the enemy. Moreover, the actual pluriversal structure of international relations satisfies the criterion of equality between the Self and the Other by precluding the emergence of a global hierarchy, whereby a particular ‘concrete order’ lays a claim to represent humanity at large. While this pluralism does nothing to eliminate the ‘most extreme possibility’ of violent conflict, it may be said at least to suspend it in its potentiality by retaining the possibility that the ‘existentially different and alien’ might not become the enemy simply by remaining outside the ‘concrete order’ of the Self and thus positing no actual existential threat. Moreover, as long as the boundary between the Self and the Other is present, there remains a possibility that whatever conflicts may ensue from the irreducible ontological alterity, they may be resolved on the basis of the mutually recognised sovereign equality of the Self and the Other in the domain of the international, which by definition is effaced by any political unification of humanity.43 Thus, for Schmitt ‘it is an intellectual historical misunderstanding of an astonishing kind to want to dissolve these plural political entities in response to the call of universal and monistic representations, and to designate that as pluralist’.44 However, this dissolution of actually existing pluralism is not a mere misunderstanding, a logical fallacy of presupposing the existence of the unity that is yet to be established. In an invective that we consider crucial for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberal ultra-politics, Schmitt approaches liberal monism with an almost existential trepidation: ‘What would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a homeland, no longer a space for measuring and testing one’s strength freely.’45 Why is a world in which there is ‘only a homeland’, a Wendtian ‘world state’, posited as outright terrifying, rather than objectionable on a variety of political, economic, moral or aesthetic grounds? The answer is evident from the perspective of Schmitt’s ontology of alterity and the affirmation of the ‘extreme possibility’ of existential negation. If alterity is ontological and thus ineradicable in any empirical sense, then the establishment of a ‘domesticated’ world unity, a global homeland, does nothing to diminish the danger of the advent of the Other, but, on the contrary, incorporates radical alterity within the ‘homeland’ of the Self so that the ever-present possibility of violent death can no longer be externalised to the domain of the international. The monistic disavowal of alterity, of the ‘existentially different and alien’, is thus terrifying as it enhances the ‘most extreme possibility’ of killing and being killed. Schmitt’s objection to the liberal monism of the ‘homeland of humanity’ is therefore two-fold. First, the effacement of ontological pluralism, which subsumes radical alterity under the ‘universal homeland’, must logically entail the suppression of difference through the 3: ‘Since even a world state would not be a closed system, it would always be vulnerable to temporary disruptions. However, a world state would differ from anarchy in that it would constitute such disruptions as crime, not as politics or history. The possibility of crime may always be with us, but it does not constitute a stable alternative to a world state.’47 Thus, struggles against hegemony or domination, which indeed have constituted politics and history as we know them, are recast as a priori criminal acts in the new order of the world state, calling for global police interventions rather than interstate war. ‘The adversary is no longer called an enemy, but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.’48 The exclusionary potential of universalism is evident: theoretically, we may easily envision a situation where a ‘world state’ as a global police structure does not represent anything but itself; not merely anyone, but ultimately everyone may be excluded from the ‘world unity’ without any consequences for the continuing deployment of this abstract universality as an instrument of legitimation. In Zygmunt Bauman’s phrase, ‘the “international community” has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name’.49 Thus, for Schmitt, if the monistic project of liberalism ever succeeded, it would be at the cost of the transformation of the world

#### Perm do both

### 2ac – security good – pragmatism

#### Foreign policy should be guided by a mix of moral and self-interested motivations – the alt’s absolutism causes paralysis and incoherence that creates more violence

George Friedman - founder, chief intelligence officer, and CEO of Stratfor – 12/6/11, Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111205-egypt-and-idealist-realist-debate-us-foreign-policy?utm\_source=freelist-f&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=20111206&utm\_term=gweekly&utm\_content=readmore&elq=88a5097c3a284763b9202918890c5a91

Western countries, following the principles of the French Revolution, have two core beliefs. The first is the concept of national self-determination, the idea that all nations (and what the term “nation” means is complex in itself) have the right to determine for themselves the type of government they wish. The second is the idea of human rights, which are defined in several documents but are all built around the basic values of individual rights, particularly the right not only to participate in politics but also to be free in your private life from government intrusion. The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment’s definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies. It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights. This, then, yields a theory of foreign policy in which the underlying strategic principle must not only support existing constitutional democracies but also bring power to bear to weaken oppressive regimes and free the people to choose to build the kind of regimes that reflect the values of the European Enlightenment. Complex Questions and Choices The case of Egypt raises an interesting and obvious question regardless of how it all turns out. What if there are democratic elections and the people choose a regime that violates the principles of Western human rights? What happens if, after tremendous Western effort to force democratic elections, the electorate chooses to reject Western values and pursue a very different direction — for example, one that regards Western values as morally reprehensible and aims to make war against them? One obvious example of this is Adolf Hitler, whose ascent to power was fully in keeping with the processes of the Weimar Republic — a democratic regime — and whose clearly stated intention was to supersede that regime with one that was popular (there is little doubt that the Nazi regime had vast public support), opposed to constitutionalism in the democratic sense and hostile to constitutional democracy in other countries. The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us. At this moment in history, the obvious counterargument rests in some, but not all, Islamist movements. We do not know that the Islamist groups in Egypt will be successful, and we do not know what ideologies they will pursue, but they are Islamists and their views of man and moral nature are different from those of the European Enlightenment. Islamists have a principled disagreement with the West on a wide range of issues, from the relation of the individual to the community to the distinction between the public and private sphere. They oppose the Egyptian military regime not only because it limits individual freedom but also because it violates their understanding of the regime’s moral purpose. The Islamists have a different and superior view of moral political life, just as Western constitutional democracies see their own values as superior. The collision between the doctrine of national self-determination and the Western notion of human rights is not an abstract question but an extremely practical one for Europe and the United States. Egypt is the largest Arab country and one of the major centers of Islamic life. Since 1952, it has had a secular and military-run government. Since 1973, it has had a pro-Western government. At a time when the United States is trying to end its wars in the Islamic world (along with its NATO partners, in the case of Afghanistan), and with relations with Iran already poor and getting worse, the democratic transformation of Egypt into a radical Islamic regime would shift the balance of power in the region wildly. This raises questions regarding the type of regime Egypt has, whether it is democratically elected and whether it respects human rights. Then there is the question of how this new regime might affect the United States and other countries. The same can be said, for example, about Syria, where an oppressive regime is resisting a movement that some in the West regard as democratic. It may be, but its moral principles might be anathema to the West. At the same time, the old repressive regime might be unpopular but more in the interests of the West. Then pose this scenario: Assume there is a choice between a repressive, undemocratic regime that is in the interests of a Western country and a regime that is democratic but repressive by Western standards and hostile to those interests. Which is preferable, and what steps should be taken? These are blindingly complex questions that some observers — the realists as opposed to the idealists — say not only are unanswerable but also undermine the ability to pursue national interests without in any way improving the moral character of the world. In other words, you are choosing between two types of repression from a Western point of view and there is no preference. Therefore, a country like the United States should ignore the moral question altogether and focus on a simpler question, and one that’s answerable: the national interest. Egypt is an excellent place to point out the tension within U.S. foreign policy between idealists, who argue that pursuing Enlightenment principles is in the national interest, and realists, who argue that the pursuit of principles is very different from their attainment. You can wind up with regimes that are neither just nor protective of American interests. In other words, the United States can wind up with a regime hostile to the United States and oppressive by American standards. Far from a moral improvement, this would be a practical disaster. Mission and Power There is a temptation to accept the realist argument. Its weakness is that its definition of the national interest is never clear. The physical protection of the United States is obviously an issue — and given 9/11, it is not a trivial matter. At the same time, the physical safety of the United States is not always at stake. What exactly is our interest in Egypt, and does it matter to us whether it is pro-American? There are answers to this but not always obvious ones, and the realists frequently have trouble defining the national interest. Even if we accept the idea that the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy is securing the national interest irrespective of moral considerations, what exactly is the national interest? It seems to me that two principles emerge. The first is that having no principles beyond “interest” is untenable. Interest seems very tough-minded, but it is really a vapid concept when you drill into it. The second principle is that there can be no moral good without power. Proclaiming a principle without having the power to pursue it is a form of narcissism. You know you are doing no good, but talking about it makes you feel superior. Interest is not enough, and morality without power is mere talk. So what is to be done about Egypt? The first thing is to recognize that little can be done, not because it would be morally impermissible but because, practically, Egypt is a big country that is hard to influence, and meddling and failing is worse than doing nothing at all. Second, it must be understood that Egypt matters and the outcome of this affair, given the past decade, is not a matter to which the United States can afford to be indifferent. An American strategy on Egypt — one that goes beyond policy papers in Washington — is hard to define. But a number of points can be deduced from this exercise. First, it is essential to not create myths. The myth of the Egyptian revolution was that it was going to create a constitutional democracy like Western democracies. That simply wasn’t the issue on the table. The issue was between the military regime and an Islamist regime. This brings us to the second point, which is that sometimes, in confronting two different forms of repression, the issue is to select the one that is most in the national interest. This will force you to define the national interest, to a salutary effect. Washington, like all capitals, likes policies and hates political philosophy. The policies frequently fail to come to grips with reality because the policymakers don’t grasp the philosophical implications. The contradiction inherent in the human rights and the neoconservative approach is one thing, but the inability of the realists to define with rigor what the national interest is creates policy papers of monumental insignificance. Both sides create polemics as a substitute for thought. It’s in places like Egypt where this reality is driven home. One side really believed that Egypt would become like Minnesota. The other side knew it wouldn’t and devised a plan to be tough-minded — but not tough-minded enough to define what the point of the plan was. This is the crisis of U.S. foreign policy. It has always been there, but given American power, it is one that creates global instability. One part of the American regime wants to be just; the other part wants to be tough. Neither realizes that such a distinction is the root of the problem. Look at the American (and European) policy toward Egypt and I think you can see the predicament.

#### Perm do the alt

### 2ac – alt fails – intervention

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara **McCormack 10**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### 2ac – threats real

#### Literature and psychological bias runs towards threat deflation- we are the opposite of paranoid

**Schweller 04** [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

### 2ac – heg good

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

#### Securitization doesn’t result in war except when heg isn’t there to check it.

Gartzke 12—Erik Gartzke, University of California, San Diego, Could climate change precipitate peace?, Journal of Peace Research 49(1) 177–192, http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/JPRclimateconflict.pdf

Violent conflict occurs wherever human beings inhabit the globe. Disputes require some mechanism for resolution, whether this involves force or persuasion. When the stakes are high, the temptation to resort to violence as the final arbiter must remain strong. State monopolies on force do not refute, but instead reflect the logic of political competition. Of course, the fact that politics involves violence does not make all politics violent. The possibility of punishment or coercion is itself available to deter or compel, and therefore often prevents the exercise of force. Common conjecture about the eventuality of conflict ‘shadows’ political discourse, often making behavioral violence redundant. Political actors can anticipate when another actor is incentivized to violence and can choose to avoid provocation (Leeds & Davis, 1997). Alternately, ignorance, indifference or an inability to act can result in political violence. Scholars must thus view context, motive, and information to determine whether certain situations make force more or less likely.

## Politics

### Arms Turn

**Middle East conflict won’t escalate to all-out war but tensions sustain demand for arms imports**

**Neumann 95** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

More important for Middle East security are political considerations. The reality of U.S. domestic politics dictates the continuation of the very high level of U.S. assistance to Israel. Even though the new Republican majority in Congress may try to reduce the overall level of U.S. foreign assistance, the quantity and sophistication of U.S. arms exports to Israel are not likely to suffer greatly in the foreseeable future. The Israeli military doctrine requires that Israel remain qualitatively superior not only to its individual Arab neighbors, but to any combination of Arab states, and this is unlikely to change. In view of these considerations, a war between some or all Arab states and Israel has now become a practical and rational improbability. Even irrational attacks, in light of such odds, are most unlikely, unless suicidal policies are to be assumed.(18) Of course wars are not always started to be won. Anwar al-Sadat began his war against Israel in 1973 without any expectation of victory in the usually accepted form. He hoped for tactical, if not strategic, surprise--which he achieved--and he aimed at shaking up both the Israeli and the U.S. establishments. The eventual result was the Camp David Agreement. Today such a situation is unlikely.(19) Yet the arms race in conventional weapons is bound to continue for other reasons.

**That’s key to the Russian economy**

**Rivlin 05 –** Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University(Dr. Paul, “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East,” The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies)

In the years 1994-98, Russian arms exports to the Middle East exceeded $2 billion and those of the US totaled $17.6 billion.2 Russia’s arms exports to the Middle East increased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, at a much faster rate than those of other suppliers, and in 2003 alone they totaled almost $1.5 billion. Since 2000, the Middle East has accounted for 18 percent of Russian arms exports and Russia sees the region as an important market for arms and nuclear equipment, one that it is determined to retain. Yet these exports, and especially sales of nuclear materials to Iran, are highly controversial on the international scene and therefore have exacted a political price for Russia in the West and in Israel. This study examines why Russia persists in these sales nonetheless, and why it is likely to do so in the future. Three principal explanations can be posited to account for the controversial export policy. The first is economic necessity: Russia has little to sell abroad except oil and arms, and the latter provides a vital source of employment for Russian scientists, technicians, and engineers who might otherwise emigrate in search of better professional opportunities. The second explanation is political: Russia has important political interests in the Middle East that are advanced by selling arms and nuclear materials. The third is what might be called “chaos theory”: the Russian government lost control and the result was that different public and private sector bodies followed their own interests rather than those of the state.3 This study contends that the first two explanations are the key to understanding Russia’s Middle East arms export policy. The state of the Russian economy is a function of its Soviet past, and the structure that the Soviets built was a response to their geo-political position, strongly influenced by Marxist thinking (appendix1). This pattern of development isolated the Soviet Union from world markets and resulted in Soviet goods being uncompetitive on international markets. The Soviet economy developed on the basis of exploiting raw materials, together with heavy industry and large-scale production. The communist system, dominated by an archaic central planning mechanism, was unable to respond to changes in demand, and the economy did not diversify sufficiently. As a result its exports were mainly confined to raw materials and arms. When Russia became an independent state in 1991, it had little to sell abroad except oil, gas, and arms, and it was forced to rely heavily on fluctuating income from oil and gas sales.

**Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war**

**FILGER 09** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### Israel Turn

**Middle East war key to stop attacks on Israel**

**Cetron and Davies 07** -September 1 2007(Marvin, president of Forecasting International Ltd.; Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and freelance writer, The Futurist)

There are implications here for Israel as well. If Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah are invigorated by the chaos of regional war, they will also be divided by it. Some of their partisans may remain focused on Israel, but many will be drawn away by the larger conflict. There are dangers here for Israel, such as that Muslim radicals will gain still more influence in the region, but on balance the problems of a Middle Eastern war seem unlikely to be much greater than the ones Israel faces today.

**Extinction**

**Moore 09—**BA in pol sci from Wayne State(Carol, Six Escalation Scenarios to Nuclear World War III, 16 February, http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2009/02/16/six-escalation-scenarios-to-nuclear-world-war-iii)

Israel is especially dangerous because its leaders and supporters have made clear for years that if Israel was every devastated by any kind of war or attack it would retaliate in indiscriminate “Samson Option” attacks against not just on Muslim cities, but against European and even Russian targets. (See “Israeli Nuclear Threats and Blackmail ” .) Russia, of course, would retaliate with thousands of nuclear bombs against the United States. Given suspected U.S. nuclear primacy plans, Russia could feel compelled to attack the United States for acts like a U.S. nuclear attack on Iran, which is just a few hundred miles from its border. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, came within three minutes of initiating a full nuclear strike on the United States because of one Norwegian scientific rocket Russians could not identify. (Details ) And U.S. leaders also could be spooked by a nuclear incident, as the 2002 movie “Sum of All Fears” illustrates. Once there is any use of nuclear weapons, it will be like giving permission for anyone to use them. Compare it to a room full of people embarrassed to cough, but once one does, everyone else feels free to do so. Any use of nuclear weapons probably will lead to a **rapid escalation**, “out of control spiral,” to nuclear war among most or all nuclear nations–”**world nuclear war**.” The U.N. cannot stop it. U.S. imperialism and pre-emptive strikes cannot stop it. Only a worldwide disarmament movement can stop it.

### Warming Turn

**Middle East war increases investment in alternative energy**

**Cetron and Davies 07** – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:9GDlR6inIhIJ:www.docstoc.com/docs/37338044/The-Worst-Case Scenario-AnAlternativeView+22There+is+another+possibility+as+well,+and+from+the+viewpoint+of+the+United+States+it+is+extremely+interesting%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

That leaves the matter of oil. The Middle East produces nearly 31 percent of the world’s oil and consumes only one-fifth of its own output. About two-thirds of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. Perhaps one-fourth of that—around one-sixth of total consumption—comes from the Middle East. Japan imports all its oil, most of from the Middle East. Europe, India, and China all depend, to greater or lesser degrees, on Middle Eastern oil. If something disrupts the flow of almost one-third of the world’s oil, as a major war in the Middle East inevitably would, the cost of energy in the throughout the world will soar. This is a recipe for prolonged recession, and perhaps even depression, in the United States and most of its trading partners. In the short run, healing the American economy would mean accepting measures that many Americans would prefer to avoid. The United States could wind up competing with China for oil in totalitarian states that Washington currently shuns. It also might use its intelligence agencies to promote more favorable policies in Venezuela. Tapping the oil reserves beneath the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve becomes a given in this scenario. To prevent needless environmental damage, drilling would be limited to the winter, when the ground is rock-hard. In addition, the oil would be transported through double-walled pipelines to prevent spills. The pristine Alaskan environment still would suffer, but this concern would no longer prevent drilling. The West Coast also would be opened to drilling, though at distances beyond 20 miles from the beaches, not 10, as the law currently requires. The risk of environmental damage here too would be considered an acceptable price for economic survival. Less controversially, the U.S. surely would buy still more oil from Canada, where a significant new field has recently been discovered, and would develop the deep-water deposits under the Gulf of Mexico much faster than anyone now plans. Crude oil, of course, is useless without sufficient refining capacity, and the United States already needs more than it possesses. No new refineries have been built there in more than 20 years, thanks to a combination of environmental concerns and the unwillingness of potential neighbors to have a refinery in their back yards. To meet America’s current need for gasoline and heating oil, at least four new refineries are required. The only obvious solution is for the federal government to build them around the country, either on government-owned land or on property obtained through eminent domain. These might be sold or leased to oil producers or operated by the government itself. At the same time, it should use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve much more actively to mitigate temporary supply shortages. The United States also needs at least seven new atomic power plants to meet its current and future demand for electricity. An energy crisis finally would break the country’s de facto ban on new reactors, allowing the construction of at least those seven. These first generating stations would use safe hot-water reactors. Even safer technologies lie further in the future, and they are likely to be adopted once they become available. Expanding the use of atomic energy of course means finding somewhere to put still more nuclear waste. This is not a technological problem, so much as a political one. The ideal hiding place for atomic waste was recognized almost as soon as anyone considered the problem. The salt domes of Louisiana have been geologically stable and free of water for hundreds of millions of years; if they had not been, water would long since have washed the salt away. Nuclear waste could safely be stored in one of them until it decayed to the level of background radiation. However, thanks to Louisiana’s political power decades ago, the law forbids consideration of any depository other than the Yucca Mountain site now being developed by the Atomic Energy Agency. In an energy emergency, that law is likely to be rescinded and the country will finally do the obvious. Nuclear waste will be buried in salt domes and forgotten. We can expect a much stronger push for alternative energy as well. Given the proper incentives—and a world oil shortage seems likely to qualify—solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies already have proved useful. Germany, where cloudy days are common, is home to 15 of the world’s largest photovoltaic power plants. The American Southwest would be a much more cost-efficient place to collect solar power. Add in expanded use of wind power where it is most available, perhaps some wave energy on the coasts, and a much stronger effort to develop biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol, and alternative energy stands a good chance of helping out if Middle Eastern oil suddenly becomes unavailable. Yet it will not be available immediately, and it will replace all the energy now coming from the Middle East.

**Renewables solve warming**

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Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and Other Greenhouse Gases (GHG) In its most recent report released on April, 2007, theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—a forum made up of thousands of the world’s top climate scientists—concluded that continued emissions of greenhouse gases will contribute directly to global: • Changes in the distribution, availability, and precipitation of water, resulting in severe water shortages for millions of people. • Destruction of ecosystems, especially the bleaching of coral reefs and widespread deaths of migratory species. • Complex, crop productivity and fishing impacts. • Damage from floods and severe storms, especially among coastal areas. • Deaths arising from changes in disease vectors and an increase in the number of heat waves, floods, and droughts.298 Policymakers should not underestimate the impacts of global warming for the United States. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change estimates that, in the Southeast and southern Great Plains, the financial costs of climate change could reach as high as $138 billion by 2100. Indeed, Pew researchers warn that “waiting until the future” to address global climate change might bankrupt the U.S. economy.299 Yet carbon-intensive fuels continue to dominate electricity generation in the **U**nited **S**tates. By 2005, almost 90 percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions were energy-related, with the electric utility industry outpacing all other sectors (including transportation)with 38 percent of national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Fossil-fueled power plants in the U.S. emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of C02 in 2003, **more than 10 times** the amount of C02 compared to the next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.301 Put simply, of all U.S. industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—the **single largest contributor** of the pollutants responsible for global warming. In 2004, almost every state in country was home to at least one power plant with significant C02 emissions. Nuclear energy is not much of an improvement, despite recent claims by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) that nuclear power is “the Clean Air Energy.” Reprocessing and enriching uranium requires a substantial amount of electricity, often generated from fossil fuel-fired power plants. Data collected from one uranium enrichment company alone revealed that it takes a 100- megawatt power plant running for 550 hours to produce the amount of enriched uranium needed to fuel a 1,000 megawatt reactor (of the most efficient design currently available) for one year.302 According to the Washington Post, two of the nation’s most polluting coal plants (in Ohio and Indiana) produce electricity exclusively for the enrichment of uranium.303 Because uranium enrichment consumes so much electricity derived from fossil fuels, many nuclear power plants contributeindirectly, but substantially, to global climate change and do virtually nothing to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emissions are included,coal plants are around 10 times more carbon intensive than solar and more than 40 times more carbon intensive than wind. Natural gas fares little better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and 20 times as carbon intensive as wind.304 The Common Purpose Institute estimates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as 0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of generation. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a 20 percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by **434 million metric tons** by 2020—a reduction of 15 percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent to taking nearly 71 million automobiles off the road.305 These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991 and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO2 by between 4.4 million and 6.7 million tons.Renewable technologies were so successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution utilities in meeting industry CO2 reduction targets.”

**Warming causes extinction**

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(Terry, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2, 2007)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to get the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

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## Military Industrial Base EXT

#### Arms exports are key to California economy

**Neumann 95** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

Budget constraints in all purchaser countries, including the United States since the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of the single most dangerous potential enemy of the U.S., the Soviet Union, have resulted in military budget cuts in the U.S. and other nations and a consequent reduction in funds at the disposal of arms industries in each country. Nevertheless, the production and export of such weapons remain highly significant to both the U.S. and Russian economies. Although deliberate efforts have been made, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, to disperse production over as wide an area as possible for demographic and economic reasons, the arms industry in the U.S. remains highly concentrated. In states like California, the economic and political effects of declining arms production are felt strongly. This is true to an even greater extent in Russia, where employment in the St. Petersburg area is highly dependent on weapons-industry exports. Sophisticated weapons systems often require many years for design and development. Production lines for airplanes and tanks, once closed down, are neither quickly nor easily reopened. When private enterprise carries the brunt of such production shifts, the reopening of such lines (once threat perceptions change) cannot be undertaken without enormous government subsidies. Hence all producer countries, especially Russia and the U.S., but increasingly China and other growing secondary producers such as Brazil and India, have a strong political interest in keeping the arms market going. Although waves of moral indignation against weapons exports rise quite high in the U.S. at certain times, the consequences of unilateral control efforts can be very drastic--and negative. In 1985, Congressional opposition to the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Arabia was demonstrated largely by supporters of Israel who professed to see a danger to the Jewish state. The Saudis, always irritated by the often rude Congressional debate, decided to buy British Tornado planes instead.(6) The result was the loss of a considerable number of jobs in the U.S., while security for Israel became even more tenuous. While the Saudis would have accepted some, though not all, downgrading of the F-15s, the Tornados were delivered by Britain without any downgrading or restrictions on their use.(7)

#### Strong Californian economy bolsters military-industrial innovation

**Gvosdev 03**—Editor at the National Interest

(Nikolas, “Recall Madness-- and Much Ado about Missiles”, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/recall-madness-and-much-ado-about-missiles-2406>, dml)

But the real issue is this: people "inside the Beltway" sometimes seem to forget that there is no "United States" apart from the fifty states (and associated territories and commonwealths). A fiscal and economic crisis in California has a direct impact on the power of the United States, since some 13 percent of the total U.S. output is produced by California. California on its own is the sixth largest economy in the world, worth some $1.309 trillion--yet this represents a decline of approximately 2.3 percent from 2000, when California's economy outperformed that of France. California represents a significant share of the country's technological base and of its human capital. The high-tech weaponry which led to a swift initial military victory in Iraq is in part a product of the technology and defense sectors of the California economy. A state budget crisis that significantly cuts back on everything from education (including higher education, where so many innovative breakthroughs have taken place) to health care has ramifications for how the United States projects its influence throughout the world. In previous issues of In the National Interest, other authors have pointed out the dangerous implications of continued deficit spending by the federal government to support overseas operations, and this problem can only increase if a continuing crisis in the principal engine of America's economy continues. And, of course, California is the bellweather for the nation as a whole. Twenty-nine states have either passed or are considering tax hikes to close budget deficits. Several states--including Hawaii, Georgia and North Carolina--will call special fall sessions of their legislatures to deal with the fact that collected taxes have fallen short of budget projections. Yet the attitude is that the recall in California is amusing political comedy, nothing more. There seems to be almost no recognition of the fact that whoever sits in the governor's chair after October 7 --whether Grey Davis survives or is "terminated" --must work quickly to solve the problems that have led California into its current quagmire. Few other countries in the world would be so blasé if political turmoil and economic collapse threatened the welfare of a key component of its national power. The California crisis reminds us that there is no neat line dividing "domestic" and "foreign" policy. Ensuring that California survives its current crisis is no less a priority than stabilizing Iraq or containing North Korea.

## Israel Ext

#### Conflict in the Middle East makes Israel more secure

**Ferguson 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Yet the biggest ethnic conflict in the Middle East today is not between Jews and Arabs. It is between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. With every passing day, the character of violence in Iraq shifts from that of an anti-American insurgency to that of a sectarian civil war. More than 100 civilians a day were killed in Iraq last month, according to the United Nations, bringing the civilian death toll this year to a staggering 14,000-plus. A rising proportion of those being killed are victims of sectarian violence. For Israel, spiraling Sunni-Shiite conflict is a dark cloud with a silver lining. The worse it gets, the harder it will be for Israel's enemies to make common cause. (Fact: Syria is 74% Sunni; Iran is 89% Shiite.) But for the United States, such conflict, emanating from a country supposedly liberated by American arms, must surely be a cause for concern.

## Warming Impact Calc

**C. it’s a “threat multiplier” that makes their conflicts inevitable and turns the case**

#### New York Times, August 17, 2009, The Climate and National Security, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/opinion/18tue1.html

Proponents of climate change legislation have now settled on a new strategy: warning that global warming poses a serious threat to national security. Climate- induced crises like drought, starvation, disease and mass migration, they argue, could unleash regional conflicts and draw in America’s armed forces, either to help keep the peace or to defend allies or supply routes. This is increasingly the accepted wisdom among the national security establishment. A 2007 report published by the CNA Corporation, a Pentagon-funded think tank, spoke ominously of climate change as a “threat multiplier” that could lead to wide conflict over resources. This line of argument could also be pretty good politics — especially on Capitol Hill, where many politicians will do anything for the Pentagon. Both Senator John Kerry, an advocate of strong climate change legislation, and former Senator John Warner, a former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, say they have begun to stress the national security argument to senators who are still undecided about how they will vote on climate change legislation. One can only hope that these arguments turn the tide in the Senate. Mr. Kerry, Mr. Warner and like- minded military leaders must keep pressing their case, with help from the Pentagon and the White House. National security is hardly the only reason to address global warming, but at this point anything that advances the cause is welcome.

**D. Nuclear war can’t cause extinction but warming does**

**The New York End Times, 06 (news filter that monitors world trends and events using a proprietary methodology to quantify movements between the extremes of war, peace, harmony, and extinction http://newyorkendtimes.com/extinctionscale.asp)**

We rate Global Climate Change as a greater threat for human extinction in this century. Most scientists forecast disruptions and dislocations, if current trends persist. The extinction danger is more likely if we alter an environmental process that causes harmful effects and leads to conditions that make the planet uninhabitable to humans. Considering that there is so much that is unknown about global systems, we consider climate change to be the greatest danger to human extinction. However, there is no evidence of imminent danger. Nuclear war at some point in this century might happen. It is unlikely to cause human extinction though. While several countries have nuclear weapons, there are few with the firepower to annihilate the world. For those nations it would be suicidal to exercise that option. The pattern is that the more destructive technology a nation has, the more it tends towards rational behavior. Sophisticated precision weapons then become better tactical options. The bigger danger comes from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists with the help of a rogue state, such as North Korea. The size of such an explosion would not be sufficient to threaten humanity as a whole. Instead it could trigger a major war or even world war. Under this scenario human extinction would only be possible if other threats were present, such as disease and climate change. We monitor war separately. However we also